I. INTRODUCTION
It is well understood that for a legal judgment to have force, the rendering court must have jurisdiction, with notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard by the parties to be bound by the judgment. There has yet, however, to be a uniform test adopted to establish personal jurisdiction when injuries have been caused over the internet. 4 Given the rapid proliferation of the internet, there remains a need to establish a test for personal jurisdiction specific to the online context. Additionally, this test should further policy goals of fairness and efficiency. Because of the nature of injuries that can occur involving the internet, and the variance in harm for different types of injuries, it is possible that different tests for jurisdiction will be best suited for different types of
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION DEFINED
In personam jurisdiction, or personal jurisdiction, refers to a court's jurisdiction over a person. 8 This section addresses the constitutional issues associated with establishing personal jurisdiction, beginning with Pennoyer, and tracking the evolution of the Due Process standard. Localization problems are also addressed, which have existed since interstate travel and commerce became routine. The Stream of Commerce is also explored inasmuch as it relates to the online context. Throughout this section, public policy issues in establishing personal jurisdiction are also addressed, with particular attention to the fairness aspects of asserting jurisdiction.
A. Evolution of the Due Process Standard
In order for a judgment to be enforceable, the rendering court must have jurisdiction over the parties that will be bound by the judgment. United States, provided it comports with the Constitution. 10 One of the constitutional limits on rendering courts is the Fourteenth Amendment.
11
Due Process was first invoked as a standard for establishing personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 In Pennoyer, a judgment was rendered in Oregon against a non-resident, who was not served with notice of the cause of action. 13 This judgment was held invalid due to a lack of personal jurisdiction.
14 Pennoyer stands for the proposition that a state can exert jurisdiction over an individual within its territory and cannot exert jurisdiction over an individual outside of its territory. 15 Courts were thus limited in that they could only bind persons to judgments if those individuals were within their territory. The Court further emphasized the importance of notice in exercising jurisdiction when it asserted that an individual must have notice of an action before they can be bound by the judgment. 16 This holding was consistent with principles of sovereignty and reflected a time when there was little need for states to exercise jurisdiction over non-residents. This holding made it impossible for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a person who had caused an injury, but left the territory before suit could be filed. While this holding made sense for its time, subsequent technological advancement increased interstate travel and commerce. Thus, a need emerged for courts to be able to exercise jurisdiction over non-residents.
17
Pennoyer governed personal jurisdiction for almost seventy years, until the Supreme Court expanded circumstances in which jurisdiction could be exercised in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
18
In International Shoe, jurisdiction was sought over the International Shoe Company, a Delaware corporation having its principal address in Missouri, and sales personnel operating in Washington. Since the Company had operations in Washington, the State alleged it was subject to the Act, while the Company argued it was not conducting business in the State, and therefore was not subject to the Act, or to personal jurisdiction in the State of Washington.
21
The Court in International Shoe acknowledged that as the variety and effectiveness of forms of notice have increased, the requirement of a physical presence within a territory to exercise jurisdiction should be relaxed.
22
The Court thus introduced the "minimum contacts" standard for establishing personal jurisdiction, a departure from the holding in Pennoyer. 23 The Court held that if a party is not present within the forum state, jurisdiction could still be exercised if that party had sufficient contact with the state in which jurisdiction was sought. 24 The Court suggested that the contacts considered should be such that exercising jurisdiction would not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
25
The Court further held that the "contacts" themselves must be measured by the "quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws." 26 Together, these concerns suggest that the "contacts" evaluated must be considered both with respect to the volume of contacts the party had with the state and the relatedness of each contact to the claim.
Jurisdiction was established over the company in International Shoe by satisfying this "minimum contacts" standard. 27 The Court stated that when a corporation conducts activity in a state, it enjoys the benefits of the laws in said state, and thus should be equally subjected to jurisdiction therein.
28
Because the claim arose out of the sales activity within the state, the relatedness of the contacts was 20 Id. at 311. 21 Id. at 312. 22 Id. at 316. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. (citation omitted). 26 Id. at 319. 27 Id. at 320. 28 Id. at 319. 
29
The ongoing nature of that activity satisfied the requirement that there be a sufficient volume of contacts to exercise jurisdiction.
30
The corporation would be unlikely to suffer undue hardship in defending a suit in the forum, and "fair play and substantial justice" would not be offended in the exercise of jurisdiction.
31
This holding reflected a shift from basing jurisdiction solely on a party's presence within the forum to evaluating whether or not exercising jurisdiction would be fair.
B. Localization
International Shoe marked a landmark shift away from Pennoyer's conception of sovereignty, and towards a jurisprudence based on reasonableness. The dealership sold a car to a family who was involved in an accident in Oklahoma.
37
The dealership and the subsidiary had no contact with Oklahoma, because their businesses operated regionally; unilateral activity on the part of the plaintiffs to bring the product into the 29 Id. at 320. 30 Id. In fact, the plaintiffs were moving from New York to Arizona and, in the process of this move, their vehicle was struck by a drunk driver, causing severe injuries. 40 If one looks at the consequences of the injury, it is arguable that the effects of the injury are felt not only in Oklahoma, but also in Arizona, the new domicile of the Plaintiff, and in New York, where the product was sold. 41 The reasonableness factors, though not applied in this case, reflect consideration of the interests of each of the territories affected by the injury, as well as the needs and desires of both the plaintiffs and defendants. 42 In holding that the dealership did not have minimum contacts with the forum state chosen by Plaintiffs, the Court rejected foreseeability as a basis for establishing "minimum contacts." 43 The Court was careful to point out that foreseeability is not irrelevant to the determination, but that it is only considered with respect to the activities of the defendant in relation to the forum state.
44
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the fact that the vehicle was designed to travel, and that the dealership and subsidiary were aware that the car was capable of interstate travel, was insufficient to establish contacts with other forums based on the unilateral activity of the purchaser of the vehicle. 45 The benchmark for establishing jurisdiction in cases of foreseeability was whether the defendant should "reasonably anticipate being 38 Id. predates the internet, but it foreshadows the types of localization issues that can arise when an injury occurs in one location, but the effects are more widespread.
C. Stream of Commerce
The localization problem present in World-Wide Volkswagen is also present in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.
48
In Asahi, the defendant, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd. ("Cheng Shin"), a Taiwanese corporation, sought jurisdiction over Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. ("Asahi"), a Japanese corporation, in California as part of a cross-claim.
49
This cross-claim was an indemnity action in response to a suit against Cheng Shin for products liability, stemming from a motorcycle accident that occurred in California. 50 Asahi supplied the tube valve assembly used by Cheng Shin in the manufacture of its motorcycles.
51
These facts demonstrate issues of localization; while the injury occurred in California, the ramifications of that injury extend as far as Taiwan and Japan. This case also occurred in the pre-internet era, yet still raises the issue of whether the California forum could exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi, a Japanese corporation whose contact with the forum solely related to the tube valve assembly's presence in motorcycles used in California.
While there are several plurality opinions in the Asahi decision, all of the Justices concluded that jurisdiction should not be exercised over Asahi.
52
The Justices differed on how the "stream of commerce" test, previously used in other courts and mentioned in dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen, 53 should be applied when attempting to establish "minimum contacts."
54
The difficulties with the "stream of commerce" doctrine are illustrated by the variety of treatments by the Justices, and 46 Id. at 297. 47 Id. at 286. 48 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 49 Id. at 106. 50 Id. 51 Id. 52 Id. at 105, 116. 53 Grossi, supra note 32, at 636-38. 54 Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 116. Thus "[the] forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State" and those products subsequently injure forum consumers. 56 The Court in Burger King Corp. was clear that "minimum contacts" with the forum state are still required, emphasizing that foreseeability of injury in the forum state is not sufficient to justify jurisdiction therein.
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57
Applying this definition to the facts in Asahi, when Asahi sold its tube valve assembly to Cheng Shin, it was placing that component into the "stream of commerce." The difficulty of Asahi rests not in this concept, but in how the placement in the "stream of commerce" should affect the analysis of personal jurisdiction.
Justice O'Connor opined that the placement of the tube valve assembly into the "stream of commerce" alone was not sufficient to establish "minimum contacts" because this act was not an act of the defendant directed towards the forum state. the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. 59 Because Asahi did not perform any of these activities, as the company only interacted with a Taiwanese corporation, the mere awareness that the final product may have ended up in California was not sufficient to establish minimum contacts. 60 Justice O'Connor also applied the reasonableness factors introduced in WorldWide Volkswagen and concluded that asserting jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable. 61 She concluded that asserting jurisdiction over Asahi, a foreign corporation, would be highly burdensome on the defendant, especially in light of the fact that the only remaining claim in the case was the indemnity claim between Asahi and Cheng Shin; the interest of the forum state in litigating this claim is relatively low when compared with the burden on the foreign corporations to litigate in another country.
62
In sum, Justice O'Connor used both a "minimum contacts" analysis and reasonableness factors to deny personal jurisdiction over Asahi.
In contrast, Justice Brennan would have held that placing the tube valve assembly into the "stream of commerce" was sufficient to establish "minimum contacts," provided the actor was aware of where the "stream" lead. 63 Justice Brennan argued that the denial of jurisdiction should be based on the unreasonableness of the assertion, because asserting jurisdiction would violate notions of "fair play and substantial justice." 64 Justice Stevens did not address the "stream of commerce" question in this case, basing his decision only on the application of the reasonableness factors. 65 This created a plurality, rather than a majority, on the issue of the "stream of commerce" and its application in establishing "minimum contacts." 59 Id. 60 Id. 61 Id. at 113-14. 62 Id. at 114. 63 Id. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring). 64 Id. at 116. 65 Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring). In that case, a plaintiff bringing a products-liability action in the State of New Jersey sought jurisdiction over a corporation based in England. 67 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion emphasized that while a defendant could be subject to jurisdiction without entering the forum state in some cases, the principal inquiry is whether the defendant has "manifest[ed] an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign." 68 This conception of "purposeful availment" was the impetus for Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi; a defendant must do more than merely anticipate that its product may end up in the forum state to be subject to jurisdiction therein. 69 In J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd., it was held that the defendant's activities did not manifest an intent to subject itself to jurisdiction in the forum state.
70
Justice Kennedy rejected the "stream of commerce" because it could not supersede the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause. 71 He further opined that whatever strong interest may have existed for the plaintiff to litigate in the forum state, it could not outweigh these considerations.
72
The concurrence offered by Justice Breyer took a more fact-specific approach to the "stream of commerce" and avoided a broad holding about the application of the "stream of commerce." 73 Justice Breyer focused on the lack of "regular" sales or flow of commerce into the forum state in order to justify denying personal jurisdiction. 74 Further, he explicitly rejected the proposed standard from several amici: that jurisdiction should be exercised if the party "knows or reasonably should know that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states." the focus on the inquiry should be the relationship between the defendant and the forum, and rejected the use of an absolute rule in resolving the question of personal jurisdiction.
76
The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg, would have exercised personal jurisdiction on the basis of fairness, and the fact that by engaging a subsidiary to sell their product in the United States, the requirements of "purposeful availment" were satisfied. 77 Justice Ginsburg believed that the "stream of commerce" doctrine should not apply in this case, because the defendant deliberately sought to enter the United States market, unlike Asahi, and that Asahi was merely manufacturing a component part, rather than a whole product.
78
Justice Ginsburg was particularly focused on fairness considerations, and the potential burden on a United States party in cases involving foreign defendants.
79
Because of this, Justice Ginsburg would have held that personal jurisdiction could be exercised in the state where the injury occurred.
80
The cases addressing the "stream of commerce" are important to the issue of establishing minimum contacts in internet cases because the "stream of commerce" serves as an analogy to how the internet operates in practice. By placing a product in the "stream of commerce" the actor has a reasonable expectation of where that product may be sold or used, but the possibility exists that the product will travel in unforeseen ways due to the activity of the end user. Similarly, by posting something on the internet, the user will have a reasonable expectation of where and how that information may be accessed, but the information can spread in a viral manner unanticipated by the poster. This means that the rationales applied by the Justices to the "stream of commerce" are potentially applicable to internet cases. This will be discussed further in Part III, where the current state of the law with respect to establishing personal jurisdiction in the internet context will be analyzed.
III. STATE OF THE LAW: PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN ONLINE DEFAMATION CASES
The Court has not yet announced a definitive test to address personal jurisdiction in cases involving the internet. The Court has put forth a test for 76 Id. at 891-92. 77 Id. at 903-05 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 78 Id. at 908. 79 Id. at 906, 909. 80 Id. at 910. which can inform the analysis of defamation that occurs using the internet. Several circuit and district courts have examined cases involving the internet and have promulgated different standards for evaluating personal jurisdiction.
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82
This section explores the standard for non-internet defamation, as well as the Zippo "sliding scale," 83 an early internet case discussing personal jurisdiction.
A. Calder "Effects Test"
Calder v. Jones is not itself an online case, 84 but has implications for defamation cases occurring over the internet. Calder is illustrative of how the Supreme Court views the impacts of an injury and the role that those impacts play in asserting jurisdiction. In Calder, the plaintiff brought an action in California for libel. 85 The alleged libelous article had been written and edited in Florida, and was published in a national magazine, the National Enquirer, having a large circulation in California. 86 The petitioners in Calder were two Florida residents, the Enquirer's president and editor, and one of the Enquirer's reporters, whose byline appeared on the alleged libelous article. 84 Calder, 465 U.S. at 784. 85 Id. 86 Id. at 784-85 ("The Enquirer is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. It publishes a national weekly newspaper with a total circulation of over 5 million. About 600,000 of those copies, almost twice the level of the next highest State, are sold in California."). 87 Id. at 785-86. 88 Id. ("Petitioner South is a reporter employed by the Enquirer. He is a resident of Florida, though he frequently travels to California on business. South wrote the first draft of the challenged article, and his byline appeared on it. He did most of his research in Florida, relying on phone calls to sources in California for the information contained in the article. Shortly before publication, South called respondent's home and read to her husband a draft of the article so as to elicit his comments upon it. Aside from his frequent trips and phone calls, South has no other relevant contacts with California. Petitioner Calder is also a Florida resident. He has been to California only twice-once, on a pleasure trip, prior to the publication of the article and once after to testify in an unrelated trial. Calder is president and editor of the Enquirer. This finding was largely based on the "effects" of the article:
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in California. 90 Some lower courts have interpreted Calder as crafting a three-factor "effects" test for personal jurisdiction in cases that involve intentional torts.
91
These factors can be represented as follows:
(1) the defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum, such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm; and (3) the defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity. 92 It has been posited that instead of viewing this test as specific to intentional tort doctrine, it should be viewed as harmonious with minimum contacts analysis. This view comports of the subject of the article and edited it in its final form. He also declined to print a retraction requested by respondent. Calder has no other relevant contacts with California.") (citations omitted). 89 Id. at 790. 90 Id. at 788-89 (citations omitted). This is especially important in light of the fact that the Court in Calder did not rely on the contacts associated with the activities of the employer, or the specific circulation of the magazine within California, in reaching this conclusion. 96 The facts in Calder represent an important analogy to the internet. In Calder, jurisdiction was asserted over individuals who promulgated allegedly libelous information into a forum with which they otherwise had limited contact.
97
While Calder predates the internet, it addresses an industry, the publishing industry, that shares many characteristics with the internet; wide-reach, accessibility, and the ability to have an effect in a forum without having entered it. An individual posting on a social media website can have the same effect as the article in Calder without ever leaving their home. Calder, therefore, represents an important building block when assessing how personal jurisdiction should be assessed in cases involving the internet and is especially relevant to defamation cases involving the internet and social media.
The holding in Calder has not been interpreted uniformly by lower courts. In Walden v. Fiore, tortious conduct occurred in Georgia that had an effect on the plaintiff in Nevada.
100
The defendant had no other contact with Nevada.
101
The district court in that case relied on Calder to dismiss the action, because defendant's knowledge that plaintiff lived in Nevada and that the harm would occur in Nevada was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the Nevada forum.
102
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the tortious activity was "expressly aimed" at Nevada with 95 Calder, 465 U.S. at 787. 96 Ludington, supra note 91, at 551. 97 Calder, 465 U.S. at 786. 98 Grossi, supra note 32, at 644. 99 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct 1115, 1123-24 (2014). 100 Id. at 1119. 101 Id. knowledge that the effect of that activity would be felt in Nevada. 103 The Supreme Court ultimately held that personal jurisdiction could not be exercised because the only connection between the defendant and the forum state was the plaintiff. 104 In reaching this holding, the Court further elaborated on its holding in Calder:
The crux of Calder was that the reputation-based "effects" of the alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the plaintiff . . . because publication to third persons is a necessary element of libel, the defendants' intentional tort actually occurred in California. . . . In this way, the "effects" caused by the defendants' article-i.e., the injury to the plaintiff's reputation in the estimation of the California public-connected the defendants' conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there. That connection, combined with the various facts that gave the article a California focus, sufficed to authorize the California court's exercise of jurisdiction. 105 The Court held that in cases of defamation, a "contact" between the alleged libeler and the forum state can be established upon the publishing of the content, as long as there are factual circumstances that suggest a focus on that forum.
106
This implies a case-by-case review of facts and circumstances consistent with established personal jurisdiction precedent. This clarification is particularly relevant to defamation cases because libel is directly connected with the act of publishing the content.
107
As such, personal jurisdiction in cases involving online defamation would necessarily involve at least some contact with the forum in which a plaintiff asserts the injury has occurred. Whether this contact is sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" test still requires applying the foundational personal jurisdiction precedents and assessing policy goals of fairness as dictated by those precedents.
B. Zippo Sliding Scale
Turning to cases directly involving the internet, the Western District of Pennsylvania addressed personal jurisdiction in a dispute over an internet domain 103 Id. 104 Id. at 1126. 105 Id. at 1123-24. 106 Id. at 1124. 107 
Id.
The "Zippo sliding scale" represents the notion that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the internet."
114
The court framed this as a "sliding scale," featuring on one end situations where a defendant clearly conducts business over the internet (i.e., the exercise of jurisdiction is proper if the defendant knowingly and repeatedly transmits files over the internet to the forum) and, on the other end, situations where the defendant merely posts information on the internet that is accessible in foreign jurisdictions (i.e., a passive 108 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 109 Id. at 1121. 110 Id. 111 Id. ("Dot Com's contacts with Pennsylvania have occurred almost exclusively over the Internet. Dot Com's offices, employees and Internet servers are located in California. Dot Com maintains no offices, employees or agents in Pennsylvania. Dot Com's advertising for its service to Pennsylvania residents involves posting information about its service on its Web page, which is accessible to Pennsylvania residents via the Internet. Defendant has approximately 140,000 paying subscribers worldwide. Approximately two percent (3,000) of those subscribers are Pennsylvania residents. These subscribers have contracted to receive Dot Com's service by visiting its Web site and filling out the application. Additionally, Dot Com has entered into agreements with seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania to permit their subscribers to access Dot Com's news service. Two of these providers are located in the Western District of Pennsylvania."). 112 Id. at 1121. 
115
In cases falling in the middle, jurisdiction is determined by examining the "level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site."
116
In Zippo, it was held that Dot Com's activities constituted "purposeful availment" of jurisdiction in the forum state. 117 Because the transactions that Dot Com entered into with persons in Pennsylvania were intended to result in the transmission and downloading of electronic messages in the forum state, this activity was sufficient to establish "purposeful availment" of the forum.
118
With respect to "minimum contacts," the court held that sufficient contact existed because a single contact can be sufficient to establish jurisdiction, and the claim arose out of Dot Com's conduct within the forum state.
119
With respect to trademark infringement, the court relied on the principle that the "cause of action occurs where the passing off occurs."
120
Because the infringement, and thus the injury, occurred in Pennsylvania, and the claim arose out of these actions within the forum state, the contacts were sufficiently related to the claim to establish personal jurisdiction.
121
The court also considered the reasonableness factors, although it did not cite to World-Wide Volkswagen, and concluded that Pennsylvania's interest in litigating the case, and the plaintiff's choice of forum, outweighed the burden on the defendant. 122 Thus, the court concluded the exercise of jurisdiction over Dot Com was appropriate, despite its only contacts being internet-based. 123 Like International Shoe, the Zippo decision created a continuum for evaluating the defendants contacts with the forum state and determining if those contacts were sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction.
124
While in International Shoe the principal inquiry was the volume of contacts with the forum state and the relatedness 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Id. at 1125-26. 118 Id. at 1126. 119 Id. at 1127. 120 Id. at 1127 (citation omitted). 121 Id. The more interactive the website, the more concrete the contact.
126
The sliding scale allows for courts to take interactivity into account when determining if exercising personal jurisdiction is proper.
127
The Zippo decision fits with the larger jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction for this reason, however this test does not provide adequate means for evaluating personal jurisdiction in online cases where business is not being conducted, because the test is framed in the commercial context. 128 Further, in cases of online defamation, it is likely that the defamatory content is being transmitted passively, for example by posting on social media or some other online forum. The Zippo sliding scale would be of little help to someone seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction in the state where the injury occurred if the information was merely posted on social media and proliferated with limited interaction by the poster or enduser. As the internet has evolved, the way users interact with it has changed, especially in the context of social media. This underlies the uncertainty amongst the courts in how to evaluate personal jurisdiction in cases involving the internet.
Additionally, as discussed infra, the "stream of commerce" is analogous to how the internet functions, especially when considering how information can promulgate.
129
The Zippo test, however, does nothing to address this reality. The "stream of commerce" framework can account for unintended or unanticipated promulgation of products into a forum, by denying jurisdiction if there is no purposeful availment of the laws of the forum, and taking into account such considerations as awareness and targeting.
130
The Zippo sliding scale, however, is not designed to account for the internet's "viral" nature. Zippo merely evaluates the level of "interactivity" of the website.
131
It has been suggested that for internet libel cases, Zippo should be ignored altogether.
132
While Zippo is a highly influential early 125 Id. The Fourth Circuit posited that the mere act of posting information to the internet was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 143 This was because information posted to the internet is available everywhere, and thus there would be no territorial limit on asserting jurisdiction, which would conflict with "traditional due process principles."
144
The court examined the content of the allegedly defamatory articles, and determined that the focal point of the articles was Connecticut, and not the Virginia forum, because the articles were focused on Connecticut policy. 145 The court further looked to the larger content of the online newspaper, including the other stories published and the associated advertisements, to conclude that the newspaper had a local focus and was not targeted at the Virginia forum.
146
The Fourth Circuit thus shifted the inquiry from the "effects" of the publishing, as in Calder, to a test based on whether an intent to "aim" or target the content to the forum state is present.
B. Awareness as a Threshold for Personal Jurisdiction
The Fourth Circuit's concerns about the internet's broad reach, and the potential of undermining due process standards if internet users were subject to jurisdiction everywhere, are reasonable. However, by eliminating the "effects" of internet postings from the analysis, the Fourth Circuit contravenes the mandate of Calder. It has been noted that the only distinguishable feature between Young and Calder is the involvement of the internet.
147
But the Fourth Circuit need not abandon the "effects" test in order to account for this difference.
The Fourth Circuit has interpreted Calder narrowly, reading in a requirement that the defendant's conduct be directed towards the forum state. 148 However, when the Supreme Court used the "effects" rationale in Calder, it incorporated the effects of the publication into the contacts analysis.
149
The conduct was "targeted" at the forum state by virtue of the fact that the person allegedly defamed lived in the state, and all of the effects of the reputational harm were felt in the forum state. effects were ultimately sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction, even with the court electing not to consider the actual circulation of the publication in the forum.
151
In Calder, those effects gave rise to minimum contacts. The Young test can be improved because it ignores the posture of the Supreme Court in Calder, with insufficient justification to do so.
As suggested by Young, something more than the mere posting of information on the internet is required to find jurisdiction.
152
Returning to our stream of commerce analogy, both effects and awareness should be analyzed in order to evaluate if sufficient contact exists with the forum state. Although the Justices differed on how the stream of commerce doctrine should be applied, several at least considered how awareness effected the minimum contacts analysis. Justice Brennan deemed that awareness alone would be enough to assert jurisdiction.
153
Justice O'Connor opined that something more than mere awareness that a product could end up in a particular forum was necessary.
154
This is the very same sentiment expressed by the court in Young, though with respect to posting information to the internet rather than placing a product into the stream of commerce. By looking to stream of commerce jurisprudence, the Young test can be modified to address the concern of overly broad jurisdiction in the internet context without forcing plaintiffs to litigate in an inconvenient forum. Although the stream of commerce doctrine has not led to a clear personal jurisdiction mandate, 155 the underlying policy rationales are applicable and can help resolve the conflict between Calder and Young.
Thus, a new test is proposed. The test for online defamation cases should be the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Calder, with one slight modification. The analysis should consider whether the defendant was aware that his statements would have an effect in the forum state, rather than if there was an express targeting of the forum. An objective test, based on whether the defendant knew, or should have known, that their statements would cause harm in the forum should be considered in conjunction with the Calder effects analysis. This accounts for the breadth of the internet, without requiring the high threshold of "targeting" suggested by the Young The court in Young examined the content of the newspaper, as well as its advertisements to determine that the publication had a local focus that did not reach the Virginia forum.
157
Under an awareness test, a showing that the publishers of the New Haven Advocate knew or should have known that potential harm to the warden could occur in the Virginia forum would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction (for example, awareness of his place of employment, the subject of the allegedly defamatory article). In the social media context, a designation of a user's location on their profile would satisfy this standard, i.e., if defamatory comments are made on a business page, and that page designates the business location, the commenter would objectively be aware that damages could occur in that forum.
In both Calder and Young the defendants were aware of the location of their subjects and that any harm associated with their words would be felt in that forum. However, only one of those defendants had to litigate in the plaintiff's forum. In order to combat the possibility that jurisdiction would be too widespread, awareness of the forum should be part of the analysis of the effects. This would prevent jurisdiction from being asserted in a case where the actor was unaware of the location of the harm. Raising the level of requirement to targeting, however, unfairly limits the ability of plaintiffs to pursue defamation actions when the authors of allegedly defamatory statements knew full well where the harms of their words would be felt. Requiring awareness, but not targeting, would allow jurisdiction to be asserted if the publisher was aware of the location of its subject, even if the publication had no specific intent of reaching any particular forum. Relying on targeting, an intent-based standard, has many of the same difficulties as described in the stream of commerce. Internet users generally do not intend for their content to go viral. Even so, this uncontrolled proliferation can have widespread effect. By using a knowledge based standard, jurisdiction will be fairly limited to forums a defendant would reasonably expect to litigate in.
Thus, the result in Young would be to allow jurisdiction in the Virginia forum where the subject of the article was located. The result of Calder would be undisturbed. This "awareness" test would broaden the reach of jurisdiction, but not unduly so. Since the internet has such a widespread reach, broadening the reach of jurisdiction would protect plaintiffs. Jurisdiction is still subject to due process limits, so defendants are still protected, as Calder informs how the minimum contacts analysis should proceed in defamation cases.
